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Abstract—Object capabilities are a technique for fine-grained
privilege separation in programming languages and systems,
with important applications in security. However, current for-
mal characterisations do not fully capture capability-safety of
a programming language and are not sufficient for verifying
typical applications. Using state-of-the-art techniques from
programming languages research, we define a logical relation
for a core calculus of JavaScript that better characterises
capability-safety. The relation is powerful enough to reason
about typical capability patterns and supports evolvable in-
variants on shared data structures, capabilities with restricted
authority over them and isolated components with restricted
communication channels. We use a novel notion of effect
parametricity for deriving properties about effects. Our results
imply memory access bounds that have previously been used
to characterise capability-safety.
1. Introduction
Privilege separation between components and the Prin-
ciple Of Least Authority (POLA) are key ingredients for
constructing secure systems. Since decades, systems with
object capabilities [1], [2] have supported a very fine-
grained separation of privileges. Lately, a renewed research
interest in the technique has produced implementations at
the level of the OS [3], the processor [4] and the program-
ming language [2], [5]–[8]. Applications of the technique
include sandboxing untrusted code [6], [9], efficient security
auditing [5], fault isolation [3]. The technique also has
potential applications outside security (e.g. enabling testing
in simulated environments, enforcing architectural choices),
but these have not drawn as much attention so far.
In the object capabilities model, effects can only be
produced by sending messages to objects. These can be
objects in the sense of object-oriented programming, but
not necessarily so. Device objects are primitive objects that
model resources in the outside world and produce effects
in the outside world when receiving a message. Instance
objects are programmer-defined objects that may hold pri-
vate state (data or references to other objects). They execute
programmer-defined code upon receipt of a message and this
may include sending messages to other objects. References
to objects are called capabilities, as they represent the
authority to invoke methods on those objects.
A capability-safe programming language implements
certain restrictions to enforce the object-capability model.
Such a language guarantees that sending messages to ob-
jects is indeed the only way to produce effects and that
capabilities cannot be forged. Additionally, the language
excludes globally accessible mutable state to provide control
over the capabilities that a component starts out with. These
restrictions enable low-cost fine-grained privilege separa-
tion; a programmer defines the authority of a component
by controlling the capabilities it holds.
To make this more concrete, consider a web page em-
bedding an untrusted advertisement. The advertisement’s
initialisation requires access to the DOM for at least the
ad’s designated location on the page. However, it should
be prevented from accessing or modifying other parts of the
DOM. In a capability-safe JavaScript-like language, the web
page could use the following function rnode to construct a
restricted capability for accessing a subtree of the DOM:
rnode
def
= func(node, d)
getChild = func(id)
{
rnode(node.getChild(id), d + 1)
}
parent = func()
{
if (d ≤ 0) {error} else
{rnode(node.parent(), d− 1)}
}
getProp = func(id){node.getProp(id)}
setProp = func(id , v){node.setProp(id , v)}
addChild = func(id)
{
rnode(node.addChild(id), d+ 1)
}
delChild = func(id){node.delChild(id)}

The function wraps a DOM node and forwards invocations
to hypothetical getChild , parent. . . methods, but prevents
access to nodes more than d levels higher in the tree.
Now assume the next web page initialisation function:
initWebPage
def
= func(document , ad)
document .setProp(“someProperty”, 42)
let (adNode = document .addChild(“ad div”))
let (rAdNode = rnode(adNode, 0))
ad .initialize(rAdNode)
document .getProp(“someProperty”) == 42

A capability-safe language enforces the encapsulation of the
rAdNode object, prevents direct access to document through
other channels and rules out mutable global state which
could (have been made to) contain a reference to document.
If we assume sane behaviour of document and that ad has
no capabilities besides rAdNode to begin with, then we can
convince ourselves that if initWebPage terminates, it must
return true. But can we make this reasoning precise?
Formal reasoning about code in object capability lan-
guages requires a good understanding of the model. What
exactly does it mean that a language is capability-safe? What
guarantees can we provide about code written in it and how
can we formally prove properties for maximum assurance?
Several researchers have worked on this [2], [9], [10], but to
this day, our understanding of the model is not satisfactory.
The problem is that previous research (except
Spiessens [10], [11], but see Section 7) focuses on reference
graph dynamics. For a state in a program’s execution, the
reference graph is the graph with the allocated objects
as nodes, and the references they hold to each other as
edges. Properties like No Authority Amplification and Only
Connectivity Begets Connectivity [2], [9] restrict how the
reference graph can evolve, depending on the references
held by the executing code.
Unfortunately, these properties offer only a conservative
bound on components’ authority: the topology-only bound.
It is based on syntactic structure of objects (whether or not
they contain a reference to each other) and ignores their be-
haviour. This limitation is important, because a key quality
of the model is the ability to define custom capabilities as
instance objects. Such capabilities (like our rAdNode) restrict
other capabilities, make them conditional or revocable or
otherwise modify and combine them. The object capabilities
community has studied many patterns for defining custom
capabilities, but their soundness typically does not follow
from topology-only bounds on memory access.
Contributions and Outline In this paper, we propose a
novel, more semantic approach for reasoning about object
capability languages. The key contribution is a step-indexed
Kripke logical relation [12], [13] with two key features: sup-
port for reasoning about custom effect properties using effect
parametricity (EP) and support for reasoning about shared
data structures with evolvable invariants and authority using
a novel form of possible worlds. Because we use many con-
cepts that may be new to a security audience, we provide a
gradual introduction in Section 2, where we introduce (first)
logical relations and effect parametricity and (second) step-
indexed logical relations for two simple languages without
a shared mutable store. Section 3 repeats the definition of
λJS , a pre-existing core calculus for JavaScript [14] and
presents the logical relation capturing its capability-safety.
It uses ideas and techniques from previous work [15]–[17]
but also novel ideas, in particular a variation on Dreyer et
al.’s public/private transitions [16] for modelling authority
over shared data and our notion of effect parametricity to
support custom properties about effects. We demonstrate in
Section 4 that the logical relation can be used to verify non-
trivial examples involving evolvable invariants on shared
data structures, restricted authority over them (like the web-
page-with-an-ad example above) and isolating components
with restricted communication channels. These examples
show that, contrary to previous work on capability-safety,
our results capture more than just the topology-only bound
on authority. To demonstrate that our results encompass
previous results, Section 6 derives such standard syntactical
bounds after first repeating a formulation of the properties by
Maffeis et al. in Section 5. Section 7 discusses related work
and Section 8 concludes. A companion technical report (TR)
provides more details about the relational generalisation and
contains technical details and proofs of our results [18].
2. A Simpler Setting
In order to explain our work to a wide audience, this
section gradually introduces concepts and techniques for
two very simple languages, as preparation for the subset
of λJS that we work with later on. The first is λout,FO ,
a simple first-order calculus (no lambdas) which we then
extend to the higher-order λout,HO . Both contain only a
single primitive capability, for producing textual output.
Contrary to λJS , neither calculus has a mutable store.
This reduces the technicalities for reasoning, but makes the
results less interesting. Without shared mutable data, there
is no point in defining invariants on it or authority over it
and less ways to pass capabilities around. What remains is
effect parametricity: a general property that allows proving
custom properties about untrusted expressions’ effects.
Although λout,FO allows introducing our techniques in
a very simple setting, it lacks the ability to define custom
capabilities, limiting the value of effect parametricity. This
limitation is removed in λout,HO , where we define and prove
correct a simple custom capability that restricts output to
upper-case. This simple custom capability models practical
scenarios where untrusted code in the browser might receive
a capability for injecting only valid HTML in the web page
or evaluating a safe subset of JavaScript.
The definitions in this section are an instance of a general
technique for reasoning about higher-order programming
languages known as logical relations (LRs; see e.g. [12],
[13], [15], [16]). Our LRs are unary, because we use pred-
icates rather than relations. We do not assume prior knowl-
edge about LRs and motivate and introduce the techniques
gradually throughout the text.
2.1. An output capability in a first-order calculus
We define λout,FO in Figure 1. It is a simple impera-
tive untyped programming language with expressions e and
values v. The (small-step) operational semantics is split in
two parts: pure evaluations e → e′ and impure evaluations
e→o e′. The latter may produce textual output in the list of
strings o. Multi-step impure evaluations e→∗o e′, concatenate
the outputs of the individual steps. The pure evaluation
is defined in terms of primitive pure evaluations e ↪→ e′
and evaluation contexts E that produce a strict evaluation
order. There are standard if, while, let and sequence (e; e′)
Syntax:
e ∈ Expr ::= x | v | let(x = e)e | if(e){e} else {e}
| e; e | while(e){e} | e. print(e)
v ∈ Val ::= num | str | bool | undef | null | out
E ::= · | let(x = E) e | if(E){e} else {e}
| E; e | E. print(e) | v. print(E)
Pure evaluations:
if(true){e1} else {e2} ↪→ e1 (E-IFTRUE)
if (false){e1} else {e2} ↪→ e2 (E-IFFALSE)
v; e ↪→ e (E-BEGIN-DISCARD) let (x = v) e ↪→ e[x/v] (E-LET)
while (e1){e2} ↪→
if (e1){e2; while(e1){e2}} else {undef}
(E-WHILE)
e1 ↪→ e2
E〈e1〉 → E〈e2〉
(E-CXT)
Impure evaluations:
e1 → e2
e1 →[] e2 (E-PURE)
E〈out. print(str)〉 →[str ] E〈undef〉 (E-OUT)
Figure 1. λout,FO , a first-order calculus with an output capability.
expressions. Output is produced by invoking a print method
on the primitive capability out. Note that out is an internal
value; similar to an object reference (0x1234) in a language
like Java, programmers cannot write it but the language
runtime may give access to it during execution, for example
as an argument to a program’s main. Note also that λout,FO
provides plenty of opportunity for stuck terms, e.g. an if
branching on a non-boolean or invoking print on true.
We could also throw exceptions in such cases, but stuck
expressions are simpler.
Let us now formulate our Fundamental Theorem, guar-
anteeing effect parametricity. Intuitively, the theorem states
that if an acceptability property (e.g. only producing upper-
case output) holds for the possible effects of the values
that an expression has access to (e.g. the mentioned custom
capability), then it must also hold for the expression as a
whole. These acceptability properties can be chosen freely,
as long as they are admissible. To understand the condi-
tions for admissibility, one should understand that not every
property is enforcable using the general approach of taking
arbitrary untrusted code and controlling the capabilities that
it has access to. For example, no matter what capabilities
a piece of code has access to, it cannot be forced to return
a specific value, so admissible effect properties should not
distinguish expressions by their return values.
To formalise this, we need to put in place some technical
machinery: we (a) define the properties on expressions that
we work with, (b) define when such a property is “admis-
sible” and (c) formulate the actual theorem, in terms of an
expression’s scope. Let us consider each of the steps.
Semantic properties First, we limit the properties we
work with to semantic properties, which only consider the
meaning of an expression and not syntactic artefacts. We
do this by treating as equivalent all expressions that purely
evaluate to the same expression and we only consider prop-
erties on commands: a syntactic class of expressions that are
the intended end result of pure evaluations (like values are
the intended end result of impure evaluations). In addition
to values, this also includes expressions like out.print(“abc”)
which are normal w.r.t. pure but not w.r.t. impure evaluation.
Formally, we define a command as either a value or an
expression E〈cmd0〉, blocked on a print call cmd0:
cmd0 ::= v. print(v) cmd ∈ Cmd ::= E〈cmd0〉 | v
We will work with command predicates, i.e. subsets
of commands P ∈ P(Cmd). The expression extension E[P ]
of such a P accepts an expression e if commands that it
evaluates to are in P .
E[P ] def= {e ∣∣ If e→∗ cmd , then cmd ∈ P}
A first command predicate is PureVal , containing only pure
values, i.e. numbers, strings, booleans, undef or null:
PureVal
def
= Num ∪ Str ∪ Bool ∪ {undef, null}.
Properties about effects As explained above, effect
parametricity is concerned with admissible effect properties
that are in principle enforceable using the object capability
approach. We formalise this in a very general way by taking
inspiration from monads (used to model effectful computa-
tions in pure functional languages like Haskell [19], [20]).
We define an effect interpretation as a couple (µ, ρ), where
µ ∈ P(Val) → P(Cmd) and ρ ∈ P(Cap) with Cap = {out}
the set of primitive capabilities. Intuitively, for a given
value predicate P of acceptable result values, the command
predicate µ P defines a set of expressions that impurely
evaluate to values in P . Typically, µ P will not contain
all such expressions, but only those that produce effects
deemed (in some way) acceptable. ρ defines a set of accept-
able primitive capabilities. Defined in terms of the effect
interpretation (µ, ρ), the value predicate Valµ,ρ defines the
full set of acceptable λJS values: pure values and primitive
capabilities in ρ. Valµ,ρ def= PureVal ∪ ρ.1
The couple (µ, ρ) is admissible or valid if it satisfies three
conditions or axioms. We list them and explain below:2
• A-PURE: For a value v ∈ P , v must also be in µ P .
• A-BIND: If cmd ∈ µ P and E〈v〉 ∈ E[µ P ′] for all values
v ∈ P , then E〈cmd〉 ∈ E[µ P ′].
• A-PRINT: If v ∈ Valµ,ρ then v. print(v′) ∈ µ Valµ,ρ.
Axiom A-PURE states that it must be acceptable to produce
no effects: a value in P must also be in µ P . For the second
axiom, we consider a command cmd in µ P (i.e. producing
acceptable effects and a result in P ) and an execution context
E such that E〈v〉 is in µ P ′ (i.e. produces acceptable effects
and a result in P ′) for any v in P (i.e. any possible result
of cmd). Then Axiom A-BIND requires that the composed
1. Note that Valµ,ρ does not depend on µ, but that will change later.
2. Readers familiar with monads may recognise a correspondence be-
tween A-PURE and A-BIND and the monad operations return and bind .
Γ ::= ∅ | Γ, x
v 6= out
Γ ` v
Γ ` e1 Γ, x ` e2
Γ ` let(x = e1) e2
x ∈ Γ
Γ ` x
Γ ` e1 Γ ` e2 Γ ` e3
Γ ` if(e1){e2} else {e3}
Γ ` e1 Γ ` e2
Γ ` e1; e2
Γ ` e1 Γ ` e2
Γ ` while(e1){e2}
Γ ` e1 Γ ` e2
Γ ` e1. print(e2)
Figure 2. Well-scopedness of expressions in λout,FO .
expression E〈cmd〉 should be in E[µ P ′]. In other words,
producing the acceptable effects of cmd , next the acceptable
effects of E〈v〉 (with v the result value of cmd) and a
result in P ′ should be acceptable in µ P ′. The third and
final axiom A-PRINT makes the link between µ and ρ by
requiring that an effect produced using acceptable values
(including primitive capabilities in ρ) should be acceptable:
if v ∈ Valµ,ρ, then v. print(v′) is in µ Valµ,ρ for any value v′.
These admissibility axioms impose natural conditions
for properties to be (in principle) enforceable on untrusted
code using the object capability approach. Axiom A-PURE
models the fact that we cannot prevent untrusted code from
returning any valid result value that it chooses. Similarly,
Axiom A-BIND means that we cannot prevent untrusted
code from composing two expressions that we deem ac-
ceptable individually. Finally, Axiom A-PRINT means that
we cannot prevent the code from exercising the primitive
capabilities that we allow it to access.
We point out that Axiom A-BIND should not be inter-
preted to mean that we cannot enforce policies that are state-
ful. For example, when we add mutable state in Section 3.1,
a policy that only one output may happen can be modelled
by using a flag heap variable and requiring that output can
only happen when the flag is 0 and after outputting anything,
it should be set to 1.
Scope Our third and final step towards formulating effect
parametricity, requires formalising the values that an expres-
sion has access to. We use a notion of well-scopedness of
expressions. Figure 2 defines contexts Γ as lists of variables
and a judgement Γ ` e expressing that e only uses variables
in Γ. We define JΓKµ,ρ as the set of substitutions γ that map
the variables in Γ to acceptable values in Valµ,ρ:
JΓKµ,ρ def= {γ | γ(x) ∈ Valµ,ρ for all x ∈ Γ}.
We can now formulate our Fundamental Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Fundamental Theorem for λout,FO ). For a valid
effect interpretation (µ, ρ), Γ ` e implies that for any γ ∈JΓKµ,ρ, γ(e) is in E[µ Valµ,ρ].
The theorem states that for an arbitrary expression e with
access to variables in Γ only (i.e. Γ ` e), instantiating those
variables with acceptable values (i.e. γ ∈ JΓKµ,ρ) produces
an expression γ(e) with acceptable effects and result value:
γ(e) ∈ E[µ Valµ,ρ]. A proof is in the TR, by structural
induction on the well-scopedness judgement Γ ` e.
e ::= · · · | λx.e | e e v ::= · · · | λx.e E ::= · · · | E e | v E
(λx.e1)v2 ↪→ e1[x/v2] (E-APP)
Figure 3. λout,HO , a higher-order calculus with an output capability.
Unfortunately, λout,FO is too simple for the theorem to
imply many useful results. Without function values or ob-
jects, there is nothing to play the role of an instance object: a
value that reacts in a programmer-defined way to some form
of (method) invocation. This rules out custom capabilities,
and the only result to prove is that code without a reference
to primitive capability out cannot produce output. It is still
instructive to see how that follows.
Example 1. If Γ ` e, γ(x) 6= out for all x in Γ and γ(e)→∗o v.
Then o must be empty.
Proof. Instantiate Theorem 1 with effect interpretation
(µ, ρ) = (IOtriv ,Ref triv ), where Ref triv
def
= ∅ and
IOtriv P
def
=
{
cmd
∣∣ If cmd →∗o v then o = [] ∧ v ∈ P}
Ref triv defines that there are no acceptable primitive ca-
pabilities and IOtriv P declares a command acceptable if
evaluating it produces no output and a result satisfying
P . In the TR, we show that (IOtriv ,Ref triv ) is a valid
effect interpretation. With Γ ` e and γ ∈ JΓKIOtriv ,Ref triv ,
Theorem 1 implies that γ(e) ∈ E[IOtriv ValIOtriv ,Ref triv ].
γ(e)→∗o v then implies (by a simple lemma) that o = [].
This result is not useless, but probably easier to prove
without our machinery. In a higher-order calculus, custom
capabilities make the Fundamental Theorem more useful.
2.2. An output capability in a higher-order calculus
To obtain a higher-order calculus, we add standard first-
class functions in Figure 3, producing calculus λout,HO .
The definition of commands does not change and we
reuse command predicates and E[P ] as defined before. An
effect interpretation is still a couple (µ, ρ), with µ ∈ P(Val)→
P(Cmd) and ρ ∈ P(Cap). However, the set of acceptable
values w.r.t. effect interpretation (µ, ρ) becomes more com-
plicated, since lambdas are values too. We define a command
predicate P1 → P2 containing lambdas that map values in
predicate P1 to expressions in E[P2].
P1 → P2 def=
{
λx.e
∣∣ For all v ∈ P1, e[x/v] is in E[P2]}
It is natural to extend Valµ,ρ with those lambdas that produce
acceptable effects and acceptable results when invoked with
an acceptable argument, i.e. lambdas in Valµ,ρ → µ Valµ,ρ:
Valµ,ρ
def
= PureVal ∪ ρ ∪ (Valµ,ρ → µ Valµ,ρ) (Oops!)
Unfortunately, the resulting definition is recursive in an
unacceptable way. It defines Valµ,ρ recursively in terms of
itself and this is mathematically unsound3. Formally, the
recursive equation may not have a solution (a value predicate
that satisfies the equation). Luckily, we are not the first
to encounter this problem. A well-studied technique called
step-indexing can be used to solve it [12].
The idea is to no longer work with command predicates
but use step-indexed command predicates instead. These are
predicates on couples of natural numbers and commands:
P ∈ P(N × Cmd). The fact that a couple (n, cmd) is in a
step-indexed predicate P can be understood as saying that
cmd will satisfy P when we inspect it for a maximum of n
steps. We say that cmd is n-acceptable in P . For example, for
noticing that the expression e = let(y = 3) let (z = 4) true
produces a boolean, we need to perform 2 computational
steps. Therefore, (0, e) and (1, e) could be in E[P ] regardless
of P but (2, e) only if true is considered acceptable by P .
Typically, we require for step-indexed predicates that they
are uniform; inspecting expressions for more steps should
only make more expressions unacceptable. More formally,
we define UPred(A), the set of uniform step-indexed pred-
icates over a set A as follows. For technical reasons, we
sometimes also use normal predicates in Pred(A).
Pred(A)
def
= P(N×A)
UPred(A)
def
=
{
p ∈ P(N×A) |
(n, e) ∈ p and k ≤ n implies that (k, e) ∈ p
}
We adapt our definitions to follow suit:
E[P ] def=
{
(k, e)
∣∣∣∣∣ For all cmd and i ≤ k s.t. e→i cmd ,we have that (k − i, cmd) ∈ P
}
That is: an expression is k-acceptable in the expression
extension of command predicate P if a command that it
evaluates to in i ≤ k steps is (k − i)-acceptable in P .
Effect interpretations become couples (µ, ρ) with µ ∈
UPred(Val) → Pred(Cmd) and ρ ∈ UPred(Cap) and we can
now correct the failed definition of Valµ,ρ:
P1 → P2 def=
{
(n, λx.e)
∣∣∣∣∣ For all i < n, and (i, v) ∈ P1,we have that (i, e[x/v]) ∈ E[P2]
}
Valµ,ρ
def
= (N× PureVal) ∪ ρ ∪ (Valµ,ρ → µ Valµ,ρ)
The predicate of functions P1 → P2 defines as n-acceptable
those lambdas that, for i < n, can be given an i-acceptable
argument to obtain an i-acceptable result.
Thanks to step-indexing, this definition of Valµ,ρ is
mathematically valid. Intuitively, this is because deciding
whether or not λx.e is n-accepted by P1 → P2, only requires
knowing P1 and P2 up to n − 1 steps. Hence, whether an
expression is n-acceptable in Valµ,ρ only depends on the
(n − 1)-acceptable expressions in Valµ,ρ. The more mathe-
matical story is that with a certain metric (a function that
defines a “distance” between two predicates), UPred(A) can
be seen as a complete metric space and the Banach fixpoint
theorem guarantees that unique fixpoints exist for contrac-
tive functions (i.e. applying the function to two predicates
3. The contravariant occurrence of Valµ,ρ precludes induction.
produces new predicates that are strictly closer together than
the original two). The TR explains this more formally.
Valid effect interpretations (µ, ρ) must satisfy natural
adaptations of the axioms we saw before.
• A-PURE: For (n, v) ∈ P , (n, v) must be in µ P .
• A-BIND: If (n, cmd) ∈ µ P and (i, E〈v〉) ∈ E[µ P ′] for all
i ≤ n and values (i, v) ∈ P , then (n,E〈cmd〉) ∈ E[µ P ′].
• A-PRINT: If (n, v) ∈ Valµ,ρ, then (n, v. print(v′)) ∈
µ Valµ,ρ.
Context interpretations now become step-indexed as
well: (n, γ) ∈ JΓKµ,ρ iff (n, γ(x)) ∈ Valµ,ρ for all x ∈ Γ. Well-
scopedness is easily extended to lambdas and applications:
Γ, x ` e
Γ ` λx.e
Γ ` e1 Γ ` e2
Γ ` e1 e2
We can now state the Fundamental Theorem for λout,HO .
Theorem 2 (Fundamental Theorem for λout,HO ). For a
valid effect interpretation (µ, ρ), Γ ` e implies for any n and
(n, γ) ∈ JΓKµ,ρ that (n, γ(e)) is in E[µ Valµ,ρ].
This theorem naturally adapts the previous theorem to
step-indexing and as before, it formalises our intuitive notion
of effect parametricity; if an expression e only has access
to variables in Γ and these are instantiated by values that
produce acceptable effects by effect interpretation (µ, ρ), then
the resulting expression γ(e) produces effects acceptable by
(µ, ρ) and a result that can only produce acceptable effects.
The lambdas in λout,HO can be used as custom capabil-
ities. Assume a primitive function toUpperCase that converts
strings to uppercase and consider the following expression:
upp
def
= λs. out. print(toUpperCase(s))
The function upp converts a string to upper case and prints
it using primitive capability out. The expression is a custom
capability, restricting out to allow printing only uppercase
text. But can we prove that this restriction actually holds?
Example 2. For expression e and variable u, if ∅, u ` e and
e[u 7→ upp]→∗o v, then the output o is in uppercase.
Proof. Define effect interpretation (IOupp ,Ref upp):
Ref upp
def
= ∅
IOupp P
def
=
{
(n, cmd)
∣∣∣∣∣ For i ≤ n, if cmd →io v then o isin upper case and (n− i, v) ∈ P
}
Ref upp defines that out is not an acceptable primitive ca-
pability (upp is only useful when no direct access to out is
available). IOupp defines as n-acceptable those expressions
that, when evaluated to a value in i ≤ n steps, produce only
uppercase output and an n− i-acceptable result. In the TR,
we show that (IOupp ,Ref upp) is a valid effect interpretation.
Although out is not in ρ, (n, upp) is in ValIOupp ,Ref upp
for any n, so that (n, [u 7→ upp]) is in Ju, ∅KIOupp ,Ref upp . This
follows because (n, upp) is in(
ValIOupp ,Ref upp → IOupp ValIOupp ,Ref upp
) ⊆ ValIOupp ,Ref upp .
For i < n and (i, v) ∈ ValIOupp ,Ref upp , we show
(i, out. print(toUpperCase(v))) ∈ E[IOupp ValIOupp ,Ref upp ]
So, take i′ ≤ i and out. print(toUpperCase(v))→i′ cmd . Then
i′ must be 1 and cmd must be out. print(v′) for v′ the
uppercased version of v. We show that out. print(v′) is i−1-
acceptable in IOupp ValIOupp ,Ref upp , so take i
′′ ≤ i − 1 and
out. print(v′) →i′′o v′′. Then i′′ = 1, v′′ = undef and o = [v′].
(i− 2, undef) is in ValIOupp ,Ref upp and o is in upper case.
The Fundamental Theorem then implies the safety of
upp. For arbitrary n, (n, upp) is in ValIOupp ,Ref upp and thus
(n, [u 7→ upp]) is in J∅, uKIOupp ,Ref upp . (IOupp ,Ref upp) is a
valid effect interpretation, so effect parametricity implies
that (n, e[u 7→ upp]) is in E[IOupp ValIOupp ,Ref upp ]. By a
simple lemma in the TR, this gives the required result.
2.3. Dealing with ambient authority
To understand effect parametricity, it is instructive to
consider how our proofs would fail for non-capability-safe
languages. Remember, for example, that out is internal syn-
tax, not surface syntax, i.e. the programmer is not allowed
to write it. Formally, our well-scopedness judgement Γ ` e
does not permit e to mention out, so that our Fundamental
Theorem does not apply to expressions that do mention out.
If we drop this restriction, i.e. make out part of the
surface syntax, all programs gain implicit or ambient au-
thority to produce arbitrary output. The custom capability
upp no longer works: programs can just use the stronger
capability out instead of upp to produce arbitrary output.
Formally, if we make out part of the surface syntax by
adding the rule Γ ` out to the well-scopedness judgement,
then the Fundamental Theorem should additionally require
(as an axiom) that the effect interpretation considers out
acceptable, i.e. (n, out) ∈ ρ for any n. This excludes the
interpretation used to prove safety of upp, but since upp is
no longer safe, this makes sense.
We emphasise however, that the additional ambient au-
thority can be accommodated with some changes to our
Fundamental Theorem. The benefit is small for λout,HO ,
since an effect interpretation allowing out cannot impose
any restriction on effects at all, but imagine that there
were primitive capabilities beside out. With a non-globally
accessible net capability for accessing the network, for
example, the modified Fundamental Theorem still implies
properties about how the network can be accessed and
custom capabilities restricting network access can still work,
despite the ambient authority of the globally accessible out.
3. Capability-safety in λJS
In this paper, we present our results for λJS (although
we believe they can be adapted to other object capability
languages, both typed and untyped, both low-level and high-
level). The higher-order store in λJS adds significant com-
plexity but makes the results more realistic and interesting.
3.1. LambdaJS
Figure 4 shows the syntax and operational semantics of
λJS , as defined by Guha et al. [14], but omitting exceptions
and object prototypes. The calculus is a fairly standard
untyped lambda calculus with numbers, strings, booleans,
undef and null values. There are n-ary lambdas as func
expressions and string-indexed records with field projection
e[e], field update e[e] = e, field deletion delete e[e] and
record literals {str : e}. The record operations are pure;
for example, a field update r[“fld”] = 5 does not modify r,
but returns a modified copy. Furthermore, λJS has mutable
references with update (e1 = e2), allocation (ref e; allocates
a memory cell with initial value e) and dereference (deref e)
expressions. Finally, there are normal if, sequencing (e; e)
and while expressions and unspecified primitive operators
opn.
The operational semantics of λJS is defined in two parts.
The primitive pure evaluation judgement e1 ↪→ e2 defines
the evaluation of func expressions, field projections, field
updates, field deletions, in addition to rules for let, if,
sequencing expressions and while expressions in Figure 1.
Primitive operations opn evaluate in terms of an unspecified
δn function. The actual small-step pure evaluation judgement
e1 → e2 is defined in terms of e1 ↪→ e2 and evaluation
contexts, obtaining a strict, left-to-right evaluation order.
Finally, the impure evaluation judgement (σ1, e1) → (σ2, e2)
for stores σ embeds pure evaluations, leaving the store
unmodified, and defines the behaviour of allocation (ref e),
dereference (deref e) and assignment (e = e) expressions.
Like λout,FO and λout,HO , our subset of λJS has many
stuck terms, e.g., an if branching on a non-boolean or
invoking a non-func as a function. The original λJS produced
exceptions in those cases, but we omit those for simplicity.
3.2. The logical relation
Let us now extend our previous results to λJS . As
for λout,HO , we use step-indexing to construct them in a
mathematically sound way. However, the higher-order store
that is present in λJS adds significant complexity. It adds
new types of authority (accessing and modifying heap data
structures, respecting certain invariants or protocols, in arbi-
trary or restricted ways) but also new ways for components
to communicate and pass capabilities to each other.
To support all of this, we construct additional machinery
to track assumptions that components have about shared data
structures and the authority they have to modify them. We
construct a relatively rich type of Kripke worlds to model
arbitrary invariants and protocols on shared state [13], [16].
Our notations loosely follow Birkedal et al. [15] and we use
their recipe for constructing recursive worlds (see below).
Kripke possible worlds
λJS features a higher-order mutable store, i.e., one can
use references into heap memory that may contain higher-
order data such as functions or objects. It is important that
our logical relations are powerful enough to support typical
usage of such references, and this is quite a challenge. Often,
references into the store are shared between multiple compo-
nents and correctness of a program relies upon invariants on
their contents. For example, rnode in the introduction needs
to know that the DOM is a tree, not a graph. Sometimes
l ∈ Loc c ∈ Const ::= num | str | bool | undef | null σ ∈ Store ::= (l, v) · · · δn : opn × v1 · · · vn → c
v ∈ Val ::= c | func(x · · · ){return e} | {str : v} | l
e ∈ Expr ::= x | v | let(x = e) e | e(e · · · ) | e[e] | e[e] = e | delete e[e] | {str : e} | e = e | ref e | deref e
| if(e){e} else {e} | e; e | while(e){e} | opn(e1 · · · en)
E ::= · | let(x = E) e | E(e · · · ) | v(v · · ·E, e · · · ) | {str : v · · · , str : E, str : e · · · } | E[e] | v[E] | E[e] = e | v[E] = e | v[v] = E
| delete E[e] | delete v[E] | E = e | v = E | ref E | deref E | if(E){e} else {e} | E; e | opn(v · · ·E e · · · )
func(x1 · · · xn){return e}(v1 · · · vn) ↪→ e[x1/v1 · · · xn/vn] (E-APP)
strx 6∈ (str1 · · · )
{str1 : v1 · · · }[strx] = vx ↪→ {strx : vx, str1 : v1 · · · }
(E-CREATEFIELD)
strx 6∈ (str1 · · · )
delete {str1 : v1 · · · }[strx] ↪→ {str1 : v1 · · · }
(E-DELETEFIELD-NOTFND)
strx 6∈ (str1 · · · strn)
{str1 : v1 · · · strn : vn}[strx] ↪→ undef
(E-GETFIELD-NOTFND)
{· · · str : v · · · }[str ] ↪→ v (E-GETFIELD) opn(v1 · · · vn) ↪→ δn(opn, v1 · · · vn) (E-PRIM)
{str1 : v1 · · · stri : vi · · · strn : vn}[stri] = v ↪→ {str1 : v1 · · · stri : v · · · strn : vn} (E-UPDATEFIELD)
delete {str1 : v1 · · · strx : vx · · · strn : vn}[strx] ↪→ {str1 : v1 · · · strn : vn} (E-DELETEFIELD)
Define e1 → e2 if e1 = E〈e′1〉, e2 = E〈e′2〉 and e′1 ↪→ e′2.
e1 ↪→ e2
(σ,E〈e1〉)→ (σ,E〈e2〉)
(E-PURE) l 6∈ dom(σ)
(σ,E〈ref v〉)→ (σ[l 7→ v], E〈l〉) (E-REF)
(σ,E〈deref l〉)→ (σ,E〈σ(l)〉) (E-DEREF)
(σ,E〈l = v〉)→ (σ[l 7→ v], E〈v〉) (E-SETREF)
Figure 4. Syntax and operational semantics of λJS , following Guha et al. [14], but omitting exceptions and object prototypes. For brevity, we write
undef instead of undefined and sometimes omit brackets and the return in funcs and we write (σ, e) instead of σe for clarity. The figure defines
values v, expressions e and evaluation contexts E and the primitive pure evaluation judgement e ↪→ e (not repeating rules E-WHILE, E-LET, E-IFTRUE,
E-IFFALSE and E-BEGINDISCARD from Figure 1), the pure evaluation judgement e→ e and the impure evaluation judgement (σ, e)→ (σ, e).
invariants evolve during execution, e.g., an auction object
may contain a list of bids that is modifiable, but not after the
auction is marked final. Components may also have partial
authority over a shared data structure. For example, the ad
in the example from the introduction only has the authority
to modify its part of the DOM, while other components may
modify the whole DOM. Similarly, Section 4.3 studies two
isolated components, one of which can only push values on
a stack while the other can only pop.
To support such patterns, we use another well-
established solution: Kripke logical relations. The idea is
to index our predicates by possible worlds w ∈ W , which
model a set of assumptions about (a) the current state of
data structures in the store, (b) invariants and protocols
that will be respected over them in the future and (c) the
authority that is available to modify those data structures.
Intuitively, a value v is n-accepted by an indexed predicate
P ∈ W → UPred(Val) in a world w (i.e. (n, v) ∈ P w) when
inspecting v for n operational steps in stores satisfying w
cannot make it break invariants in w or return an invalid
result. For values (which can be stored and used later), we
will require that they are valid not only in w, but in any
possible future evolution of w′ w w (to be defined later).
We define our Kripke worlds as follows:
IslandName
def
= N
W
def
=
{
w ∈ IslandName ↪→ Island ∣∣ dom(w) finite}
Island
def
=

ι = (s, φ, φpub, H) | s ∈ State ∧ φ ⊆ State2∧
H ∈ State→ StorePred ∧ φpub ⊆ φ ∧
φ, φpub reflexive and transitive

StorePred
def
= {ψ ∈ Wˆ →mon,ne UPred(Store)}
roll :
1
2
·W ∼= Wˆ
Worlds w ∈W contain a finite set of components or islands
describing disjoint parts of the store. Islands are identified
by IslandNames which are in fact just natural numbers. An
island ι represents an evolvable invariant about a heap data
structure, as well as a lower bound on the available authority
to modify the data structure. Concretely, ι = (s, φ, φpub, H)
represents a state machine with current state s and transition
relation φ ∈ State2. We assume a fixed set State of possible
states, assumed to contain all the states used in this paper.
Every island contains a function H ∈ State → StorePred
that defines when a store satisfies the requirements for a
state. These store requirements are modelled as StorePreds:
predicates on stores that are themselves again world-
indexed. The arrow →mon,ne means that H must be mono-
tone (to be explained later) as well as non-expansive (a
sanity requirement w.r.t. step-indexing, see the TR).
Finally, φpub represents an assumption about the avail-
able authority to modify the data structure. It is a sub-
relation of φ, and it represents a subset of state machine
transitions for which authority is available to make. For ex-
ample, in Section 4.2, the ad example from the introduction
will be verified using an island whose states are trees of
values that represent the current state of the DOM. We will
prove that the ad .initialize call is valid w.r.t. a world in which
φpub only allows modifications in the ad’s part of the tree
(since the ad may not modify the DOM outside of its node),
while φ allows arbitrary modifications to the DOM (since
the DOM may be modified arbitrarily by other code).
The careful reader may notice that the above definition
of worlds is again recursive: worlds contain store predicates,
which are themselves indexed by worlds. This kind of
recursive worlds is needed to deal with the higher-order
nature of λJS and we use a general method by Birkedal
et al. [15] for constructing them. The factor 12 , the set
Wˆ and the isomorphism roll play a technical role in this
construction, but we recommend the casual reader to ignore
them here and elsewhere in the paper.
Future worlds Kripke worlds represent assumptions that
a piece of code holds on the rest of the system. However,
because values may be stored and used later, any assump-
tions that they rely on must not be invalidated by legitimate
future evolutions of the system. There are essentially three
legitimate ways for a system to evolve. (a) Fresh data
structures may be allocated, and invariants or protocols may
be established for them. Additionally, (b) existing invariants
may evolve according to their established protocols and
finally (c) additional authority over data structures may be-
come available. These three types of evolutions are modelled
by the future world relation; a world w2 is a future world
of w1 (w2 w w1) if w2 contains at least the islands of w1,
but potentially more (a). For existing islands, the state in
w2 must be reachable from the state in w1 using the state
machine transitions in φ, i.e. according to the data structure’s
established protocol (b). Finally, the state machine’s set of
public transitions φpub is allowed to grow (but not beyond
its complete set of transitions φ), representing an increase
in available authority (c).
w2 w w1 iff dom(w2) ⊇ dom(w1) ∧ ∀j ∈ dom(w1). w2(j) w w1(j)
(s2, φ2, φ
pub
2 , H2) w (s1, φ1, φ
pub
1 , H1) iff
(φ2, H2) = (φ1, H1) and φ1 ⊇ φpub2 ⊇ φ
pub
1 and (s1, s2) ∈ φ1
The requirement that values that are valid in a predicate
remain valid in legitimate future evolutions of a system
is captured by the required monotonicity of predicates in
W →mon,ne UPred(A) (in addition to non-expansiveness,
a sanity requirement w.r.t. step-indexing). Formally, mono-
tonicity requires that P w2 ⊇ P w1 whenever w2 w w1, i.e.
values/stores/... that are valid in a world w1 must remain
valid in future worlds w2 w w1. In what follows, predicates
on values and stores will typically need to be monotone
(because they contain values that may be stored and used
later) while predicates on commands and expressions typi-
cally need not be, as they cannot be stored (except as part
of a func value).
The future world relation w2 w w1 represents future
evolutions of a world that a piece of code should be able to
cope with. However, it is not necessarily allowed to make
those changes itself. A more restricted public future-world
relation w2 wpub w1 defines the set of future worlds that one
has the authority to transition to:
w2 wpub w1 iff
{
dom(w2) ⊇ dom(w1)∧
∀j ∈ dom(w1). w2(j) wpub w1(j)
(s2, φ2, φ
pub
2 , H2) wpub (s1, φ1, φ
pub
1 , H1) iff
(φ2, φ
pub
2 , H2) = (φ1, φ
pub
1 , H1) and (s1, s2) ∈ φ
pub
1
A public future world w2 wpub w1 must also contain at least
the islands of w1 and may contain additional ones. However,
the new state of islands in w2 must now be reachable through
the state machine’s public transitions in φpub1 , i.e. transitions
that can be made using the available authority. Finally, φpub
is not allowed to grow in public future worlds, i.e. one does
not have the authority to increase one’s own authority. Note
that the latter precludes capabilities appearing out of thin air,
somewhat similar to the No Authority Amplification property
that we will discuss in Section 5.
Disjoint worlds (with assumptions about disjoint data
structures in the heap) can be combined with the ⊕ operator:
w ⊕ w′ = w′′ iff dom(w′′) = dom(w) unionmulti dom(w′) ∧ ∀j ∈ dom(w).
w′′(j) = w(j) ∧ ∀j ∈ dom(w′). w′′(j) = w′(j)
Finally, a store σ n-satisfies a world w if it can be
partitioned into parts that n-satisfy the store predicate for
the current state of all islands (we write ι.H for projecting
out the store predicate of an island):
σ :n w iff
{
∃σj .σ = unionmultij∈dom(w)σj and ∀j ∈ dom(w),
∀n′ < n. (n′, σj) ∈ w(j).H(w(j).s) (roll w)
It is worthwhile at this point to take a step back and build
an intuitive understanding for our worlds. Generally, they
should be interpreted as a set of assumptions with respect
to which a value or expression is valid. An expression e
that holds capabilities for making certain modifications to a
shared data structure, will only be valid w.r.t. a Kripke world
with an island governing the data structure. Private transi-
tions for the island would include all possible modifications
to the data structure that any subject in the system has the
authority to make, so that e will be required to tolerate such
modifications. Public transitions for the island will include
at least the modifications that e itself has the authority to
make. Using security terminology, this perspective means
that any expression may be seen as a subject and the world in
which it is valid as an upper bound on its required authority.
Entities in our approach are simply represented by code
executing on their behalf.
Command predicates As for λout,FO and λout,HO , we
define a syntactic class of commands: either values or ex-
pressions blocked on an impure operation.
cmd0 ::= deref v | v = v | ref v cmd ∈ Cmd ::= E〈cmd0〉 | v
Predicates on commands P are again extended to expres-
sions as E[P ], which closes P under pure evaluation:
E[P ] : W →ne Pred(Expr)
E[P ] w def=
{
(n, e)
∣∣∣∣∣ for all i ≤ n, e′. if e→i cmd ,then (n− i, cmd) ∈ P w
}
A few predicates are used as building blocks further on:
Cnst : W →mon,ne UPred(Val)
Cnst w
def
= N× Const
{P} : W →mon,ne UPred(Val)
{P} w def=
{
(n, {str : v}) | for all i < n, (i, v) ∈ P w
}
P ∪ P ′ : W →mon,ne UPred(Val)
(P ∪ P ′) w def= P w ∪ P ′ w
([P ]→ P ′′) : W →mon,ne UPred(Val)
([P ]→ P ′′) w def= {(n, func(x1 · · ·xk){return e}) |
for all v1 · · · vk, w′ w w, i < n. (i, vj) ∈ P w′ ⇒
(i, e[x1/v1, · · · , xn/vk]) ∈ E[P ′′] w′
}
Cnst n-accepts all constant values. For value predicates P
and P ′ and command predicate P ′′, {P} accepts records with
P -acceptable fields and P ∪P ′ accepts values from P or P ′.
[P ]→ P ′′ n-accepts func expressions producing i-acceptable
results in P ′′ when applied to i-acceptable arguments in P ,
in any future world w′ w w and for any i < n. As a technical
detail, the quantification over w′ w w and i < n makes [P ]→
P ′′ monotone and uniform even when P ′′ is not.
Effect interpretations and acceptable values Like for
λout,FO and λout,HO , we parameterise our LR over an
effect interpretation (µ, ρ) with ρ : W →mon,ne UPred(Loc)
a predicate of references that are valid in a given world and
µ a function that maps a predicate on values to a predicate
on commands:
µ : (W →mon,ne UPred(Val))→ne (W →ne Pred(Cmd)).
As before, µ P accepts commands producing acceptable
effects and results acceptable by a value predicate P .
Given an effect interpretation (µ, ρ) that defines accept-
able references and effectful expressions in a given world,
we define a predicate JSValµ,ρ of all acceptable λJS values4:
JSValµ,ρ : W →mon,ne UPred(Val)
JSValµ,ρ
def
= Cnst ∪ ρ ∪ {JSValµ,ρ} ∪ ([JSValµ,ρ]→ µ JSValµ,ρ)
The predicate accepts constants, references in ρ, records of
acceptable values and functions mapping acceptable values
to expressions with acceptable effects and results.
The following axioms are required to hold for a valid
effect interpretation.
• A-PURE: If (n, v) ∈ P w then (n, v) ∈ µ P w
• A-BIND: If (n, cmd) ∈ µ P w and (n′, E〈v〉) ∈ E[µ P ′] w′
for all n′ ≤ n, w′ w w and (n′, v) ∈ P w′, then
(n,E〈cmd〉) ∈ E[µ P ′] w.
• A-ASSIGN: If (n, v1) ∈ JSValµ,ρ w and (n, v2) ∈
JSValµ,ρ w, then (n, v1 = v2) ∈ µ JSValµ,ρ w.
• A-DEREF: If (n, v) ∈ JSValµ,ρ w, (n, deref v) must be
in µ JSValµ,ρ w.
• A-REF: If (n, v) ∈ JSValµ,ρ w, then (n, ref v) ∈
µ JSValµ,ρ w.
Axioms A-PURE and A-BIND are as before (except for
the quantification over Kripke worlds) and we don’t re-
explain them for brevity. Axioms A-ASSIGN and A-DEREF
essentially require a compatibility between µ and ρ. They
require that if a value is accepted by JSValµ,ρ (e.g. references
in ρ), then dereferencing it or assigning an acceptable value
must be accepted by µ. Finally, Axiom A-REF requires that
allocating a new mutable reference (a primitive effect left
unrestricted by the language) with an acceptable initial value
must be accepted by the effect interpretation.
Fundamental Theorem We conclude this section with
the Fundamental Theorem for λJS : the formal statement of
its capability-safety. As before, it informally states that well-
formed λJS terms respect the restrictions on effects imposed
4. Readers with a background in logical relations can see this as the
semantic interpretation of the unitype of λJS values.
by a valid effect interpretation, and now additionally that
they respect the invariants and protocols of a Kripke world.
The well-scopedness judgement Γ; Σ ` e states that e
is syntactically well-formed in context Γ (a list of free
variables) and store shape Σ (a list of allocated references).
Its definition is unsurprising and relegated to the TR. The
predicate JΣKµ,ρ accepts worlds in which the references in
Σ are accepted by ρ, and the predicate JΓKµ,ρ w accepts
substitutions for Γ with acceptable values:
JΣKµ,ρ : UPred(W )JΣKµ,ρ def= {(n,w) | for all l ∈ Σ.(n, l) ∈ ρ w}JΓKµ,ρ w : UPred(ValΓ)JΓKµ,ρ w def= {(n, γ) | ∀x ∈ Γ.(n, γ(x)) ∈ JSValµ,ρ w}
Theorem 3 (Fundamental Theorem for λJS ). If Γ,Σ ` e then
for a valid effect interpretation (µ, ρ) and for all n, γ and
w with (n,w) ∈ JΣKµ,ρ and (n, γ) ∈ JΓKµ,ρ w, we have that
(n, γ(e)) must be in E[µ JSValµ,ρ] w.
The theorem states that substituting acceptable values for
an expression’s free variables and considering it in a world
where its references are acceptable by effect interpretation
(µ, ρ), produces a µ-acceptable expression with a result in
JSValµ,ρ. The TR contains a proof by induction on the well-
scopedness judgement.
Note that our Fundamental Theorem does not offer
termination guarantees about untrusted code. This limitation
follows from the higher-order untyped language, in which
untrusted code cannot be prevented from diverging.
4. Local state abstraction
A special feature of our logical relation is the quantifica-
tion over effect interpretations. It allows proving properties
about primitive effects, as we saw in Section 2 and we
will use it again in Section 6. However, in many cases,
standard encapsulation of local state (e.g. instance variables
of objects) is all we need. In this section, we define an effect
interpretation (IOstd ,Ref std ) for such “standard” reasoning
about local state abstraction.
By the definition in Figure 5, an expression is n-accepted
by IOstd P w if (1) it is n-accepted by P w if it is already
a value and (2) evaluating it to a value in 0 < i ≤ n steps
in a store σr that is n-accepted by world w implies that
the resulting store σ′r is n − i-accepted by a public future
world w′ wpub w and the resulting value is n− i accepted by
P w′′. The original store is in fact allowed to additionally
contain a frame part σf which must not be modified by
the evaluation. This definition corresponds roughly to what
one would typically find in the E relation of a Kripke
logical relation, except that it only provides guarantees after
reduction to a value, i.e. the evaluation is allowed to get
stuck, and when it does, nothing is guaranteed about σ′ and
the resulting expression.5
5. This is appropriate for our untyped setting with stuck terms, but
unusual as Kripke logical relations are most often used for static type
systems that rule out stuck terms.
IOstd : (W →mon,ne UPred(Val))→ne (W →ne Pred(Cmd))
IOstd P w
def
=(n, cmd)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(n, cmd) ∈ P w if cmd ∈ Val and,
for all σr , σf , σ′, 0 < i ≤ n, v. σr :n w∧
(σr unionmulti σf , cmd)→i (σ′, v)⇒ ∃σ′r , w′ wpub w.
σ′ = σ′r unionmulti σf ∧ σ′r :n−i w′ ∧ (n− i, v) ∈ P w′

ιstdl
def
= (l,=,=, Hstd )
Hstd l w
def
=
{
(n, {l 7→ v})
∣∣∣∣∣ n = 0 or (n− 1, v) ∈JSVal
IOstd ,Ref std
(roll−1 w)
}
Ref std : W →mon,ne UPred(Loc)
Ref std w
def
= {(n, l) | ∃j. w(j) =n+1 ιstdl }
Figure 5. An effect interpretation capturing standard local state abstraction.
We instantiate ρ to Ref std , defined in Figure 5 w.r.t. an
island ιstdl . The island ι
std
l takes ownership of a location l
and requires that its value satisfies JSVal
IOstd ,Ref std
. Ref std
defines as n-acceptable all locations l that are owned by such
an island ιstdl , or at least one that n+1-approximates it. The
TR shows that effect interpretation (IOstd ,Ref std ) is valid.
Instantiating our Fundamental Theorem with the effect
interpretation (IOstd ,Ref std ) produces a logical relation that
captures the encapsulation of local state in λJS and can
be used to reason about non-trivial capability patterns. The
next sections demonstrate interesting examples of this: (1)
a ticket dispenser function featuring a non-trivial protocol
on private state, (2) the ad example from the introduction
featuring a capability with restricted authority on shared data
(the DOM) and (3) two isolated components with different
authority on a shared LIFO communication channel.
4.1. Invariants and Protocols
Consider the following expression:
ticketDispenser
def
= func(attacker)
let(o = ref 0)
let(dispTkt = func(){let(v = deref o){o := v + 2; v}})
attacker(dispTkt); deref o

The expression takes an (untrusted) function argument
attacker . The code allocates a new mutable reference o,
initially 0 and constructs a function dispTkt. When called, the
function increases o’s value by 2 and returns the old value.
If we assume for simplicity an infinite range of primitive
integers, dispTkt respects a protocol in its usage of o: its
value will always remain even and will only ever increase.
The attacker code is invoked and receives access to dispTkt.
After the attacker code returns, the value of o is returned.
Since the attacker has access to dispTkt but not o and by
inspecting dispTkt, we can expect the following to hold:
Lemma 1. Take a store σ, Σ = dom(σ) and a value ∅; Σ `
attacker . If (σ, ticketDispenser attacker) → (σ′, v), then v is
even and ≥ 0.
With our Fundamental Theorem and effect interpretation
(IOstd ,Ref std ), we can prove that this holds.
Proof sketch. If the evaluation terminates, then for some l 6∈
Σ, it must factor as follows (omitting the body of dispTkt
for brevity) with v = σ′(l):
(σ, ticketDispenser attacker)→∗
(σ[l 7→ 0], attacker (func(){· · · }); deref l)→∗
(σ′, (v′; deref l)) →∗ (σ′, σ′(l))
Define a world w with one island ιstdl for every l ∈ Σ.
Then for any n and w′ w w, we have (n,w′) ∈ JΣK
IOstd ,Ref std
.
The next island ιtkt,l,k captures l’s intended protocol:
ιtkt,l,k
def
= ((l, k),vtkt ,vtkt , Htkt ) for k even
(l, k) vtkt (l′, k′) iff l = l′ ∧ k′ ≥ k ∧ k′, k even
Htkt (l, k) w
def
= {(n, {l 7→ k}) | n ∈ N}
Define w′ = w[j 7→ ιtkt,l,0] for j 6∈ dom(w). Clearly, w′ w w.
We show in the TR that for any n:
(n, func(){return (let(v = deref l){l := v + 2; v})}) ∈
([JSVal
IOstd ,Ref std
]→ IOstd JSVal
IOstd ,Ref std
) w′ ⊆
JSVal
IOstd ,Ref std
w′
The proof takes about two paragraphs. Essentially, it shows
that executing the function in a store satisfying a world w′′ w
w′ produces a new store satisfying a world w′′′ wpub w′′.
Specifically, the island w′′(j) = ιtkt,l,k will take a public
transition to w′′′(j) = ιtkt,l,k+2 . The function’s result value
in such a store is a number, so satisfies JSVal
IOstd ,Ref std
.
By the Fundamental Theorem, attacker n-satisfies
E[IOstd JSVal
IOstd ,Ref std
] w′. Then, attacker (func(){· · · })
must also n-satisfy E[IOstd JSVal
IOstd ,Ref std
] w′ (by a stan-
dard lemma) and we can deduce that σ′ must n-satisfy some
w′′ wpub w′, so that σ′(l) must be even and ≥ 0.
4.2. Restricted capabilities
Another important object capability pattern is to give a
component restricted access to a resource, while other code
keeps full authority over it. This can be implemented by
giving the component access to a trusted object that has
full access to the resource, but whose methods allow only
restricted interaction with it. For reasoning about such a
component with restricted authority, we use a world that
carries two separate protocols for how the shared state
can evolve. A first protocol dictates changes to the shared
resource that the component itself has the authority to
make while the second specifies changes that other code
(with potentially greater authority) may make, and which
the component under scrutiny should be able to deal with.
These two protocols are given by, respectively, the public
and private transitions in an island: a component is itself
allowed to make public transitions, but must be able to cope
with private transitions made by other code. In this section,
we demonstrate this for the example from the introduction
which restricts the authority of an untrusted advertisement
in a client-side web page.
We repeat the example web page initialisation function:
initWebPage
def
= func(document , ad)
document .setProp(“someProperty”, 42)
let (adNode = document .addChild(“ad div”))
let (rAdNode = rnode(adNode, 0))
ad .initialize(rAdNode)
document .getProp(“someProperty”) == 42

The idea is that initWebPage receives access to a document
object that represents the entire web page and carries the
authority to modify it. It uses a function rnode to construct
a restricted capability rAdNode for accessing and modifying
only the ad’s part of the page and passes that to the untrusted
ad’s initialisation code. We do not repeat the definition of
rnode, which constructs an object that forwards method invo-
cations to the underlying DOM node but returns null when
asked for a node outside the ad’s turf. If everything works
correctly, we should be able to prove that if initWebPage
terminates, it must return true.
To formalise our assumptions about the behaviour of
document and its child nodes, we use a form of trees defined
by the following grammar:
tree ::= v | (id 7→ tree)∗ id ∈ String
We define a notion of plugging a subtree in a tree at a certain
path (a list of ids) as follows:
t ′[[] 7→ t] def= t
(id1 7→ c1, · · · , idn 7→ cn)[[p, p] 7→ t] def=
(id1 7→ c1 · · · idj−1 7→ cj−1,
idj 7→ t′, idj+1 7→ cj+1 · · · idn 7→ cn)
if p = idj∧
t′ = cj [p 7→ t]
undefined otherwise
We define an island ιdoml,tree,P to govern the state of the DOM.
It is parameterised by a function P ∈ String∗ →W →mon,ne
UPred(Val), which defines, for every path in the DOM, a
predicate that the DOM property at that path should satisfy.
ιdoml,tree,P
def
= ((l, tree),vdom,vdom, HdomP )
(l′, tree′) wdom (l, tree) iff l = l′
The store predicate HdomP is defined in the TR such that
HdomP (l, t) w accepts stores containing a representation of
DOM tree t and for every property in the tree at path p,
the value satisfies P p w. Note that the island’s transition
relation wdom does not restrict the evolution of the tree.
For our ad example, we define a restricted transition
relation wr−domp expressing the restricted authority of the
ad, i.e. only allowing changes to the DOM under path p:
(l1, t1) wr−domp (l2, t2) iff
l1 = l2 ∧ (∀t′1, tf . t1 = tf [p 7→ t′1]⇒ ∃t′2. t2 = tf [p 7→ t′2])
Lemma 2. Assume that document’s methods getChild , parent ,
getProp, setProp, addChild and delChild behave in the “ob-
vious” way (to be defined formally in the TR) in stores
that contain the representation of a state of the DOM. If
w(j) = ιdoml,t,P for some j, t and P , σ :n w, and ad is a closed
expression and (σ, initWebPage(document , ad)) →i (σ′, v) for
i ≤ n, then v = true.
The proof of this lemma is essentially based on the
restricted transition relation wr−dom mentioned above. How-
ever, it is complicated by the fact that DOM properties can
be higher-order, i.e. functions that carry and use capabilities
themselves. In the proof, we have to express that DOM
properties under “ad div” have the same authority restriction
as the ad. But what about the authority of trusted code
(including DOM properties outside “ad div”)? Naturally,
this other code may modify the rest of the DOM, but can
it modify the tree under “ad div”? Crucially, the code must
not (by accident or malice) store capabilities with authority
greater than the ad’s (e.g. document itself) inside the ad’s
reach. The most general solution is to require that they do
not do this, i.e. that they preserve the authority bound of
the ad. However, because initWebPage terminates after the
ad .initialize call, and no trusted code gets a chance to run,
this requirement is not in fact necessary for the lemma
above. The proof in the TR relies on this simplification
and does not restrict the DOM properties outside the ad’s
territory. However, we think it can be generalised if needed.
4.3. Isolated but communicating components
Another interesting pattern is similar to the previous
example, but features multiple untrusted components that
have restricted and different authority to a shared resource.
In such a scenario, it is necessary to prevent the resource
from being used as a communication channel for passing
capabilities to the other component that it does not hold.
Consider a mashup page that embeds two disjoint pieces
of untrusted code: attacker1 and attacker2. The mashup
sets up a restricted communication channel: a stack that
attacker1 and attacker2 can respectively push to and pop
from. Figure 6 shows what the mashup’s code could look
like. If we suppose that attacker1 and attacker2 do not share
a communication channel to begin with, then evaluating
mashup in an arbitrary heap should always produce a non-
negative number. Note that this example only works if the
stack rejects non-constant values: if not, attacker1 could push
the push function itself on the stack, for attacker2 to retrieve
and use for stepping outside its pop-only authority.
Formally, the expected result is as follows:
Lemma 3. If (n, attacker i) are in JSValIOstd ,Ref std wi for
i = 1, 2 and disjoint worlds w1 and w2 and if a store σ
n-satisfies w1 ⊕ w2 for n sufficiently large, then executing
mashup(attacker1, attacker2) in σ, produces a result ≥ 0.
The premise that the attackeri are in JSValIOstd ,Ref std
for disjoint worlds expresses the informal requirement that
they do not share a communication channel to begin with.
mashup
def
= func(attacker1, attacker2)
let (stk = ref null)
let (push = func(v){
if ¬isConstant(v) then undef else
stk = ref({val = v, rest = deref stk}); undef
}
)
let (pop = func()
let (top = deref stk)
if (top == null){undef}
else {stk = (deref top).rest ; (deref top).val}}
)
let (size = func()
let (c = ref 0)
let (top = ref (deref stk))
while ((deref top) ! = null){
c = deref c+ 1; top = (deref top).rest}
deref c

)
attacker1(push)
let (s1 = size())
attacker2(pop)
s1 − size()

Figure 6. A mashup application embedding two untrusted components,
isolated from each other but with a restricted communication channel.
If they did, then attacker1 could pass the push capability to
attacker2 and break our result. In practice, the requirement
should be easily provable thanks to the absence of global
mutable state in our capability-safe language. According
to the Fundamental Theorem, the premise is satisfied, for
example, if we know that the two pieces of code are well-
formed in an empty context and empty store typing.
Proof sketch. In this proof sketch, all statements should be
interpreted with respect to a sufficiently large step-index n.
We first define an island ιstack
(s,v¯)
capturing the stack’s
invariant; its states are the list of values in the stack and
its private transition relation wstack allows arbitrary modi-
fications. We also define two restricted transition relations
wstack↑ and wstack↓ that allow the stack to only grow or
shrink respectively:
ιstack(s,v¯)
def
= ((s, v¯),wstack ,wstack , Hstack )
(l′, v¯′) wstack (l, v¯) iff l = l′
(l′, v¯′) wstack↑ (l, v¯) iff l = l′ ∧ ∃v¯′′. v¯′ = v¯′′v¯
(l′, v¯′) wstack↓ (l, v¯) iff l = l′ ∧ ∃v¯′′. v¯ = v¯′′v¯′
Hstack (l, (v1 · · · vn)) w def=(n, σ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃l1, · · · , ln, ln+1, v1 · · · vn ∈ Const . σ(l) = l1∧
dom(σ) = {l, l1, · · · , ln} ∧ ln+1 = null∧
∀i ∈ 1..n. σ(li) = {val = vi, rest = li+1}

After allocating a location l for stk , we define a world
w3, with dom(w3) = {j}, w3(j) = ιstack(l,·) for some j and the
empty list ·. Next, we show that push is in JSVal
IOstd ,Ref std
for world w3[j.φpub 7→wstack↑] and pop in JSValIOstd ,Ref std
for world w3[j.φpub 7→wstack↓]. We can derive that
attacker1(push) is accepted by E[IOstd JSValIOstd ,Ref std ]
in world w4
def
= w1 ⊕ (w3[j.φpub 7→wstack↑]) and we get
that the resulting store is valid in a world w′1 ⊕ w′3 with
dom(w′3) = {j} and dom(w′1) ⊇ dom(w1). From the fact
that w′1 ⊕ w′3 wpub w4, we know that the stack can only
have grown. We can also derive that attacker2(pop) is
accepted by E[IOstd JSVal
IOstd ,Ref std
] in a world w5
def
=
w2 ⊕ (w′3[j.φpub 7→wstack↓]) and notice that the part of the
store satisfying Hstack (w′3(j).s) (w′1 ⊕ w′3) will also sat-
isfy Hstack (w′3(j).s) w5 because (crucially) the definition of
Hstack ignores its world argument, which it can because the
content of the stack is restricted to first-order values. We
then obtain a resulting world w′2 ⊕ w′′3 with dom(w′′3 ) = {j}
and dom(w′2) ⊇ dom(w2). We conclude from the fact that
w′2⊕w′′3 wpub w5, that the stack can only have shrunk. Since
size is called in a store satisfying w′1 ⊕ w′2 ⊕ w′′3 , s1 − size()
must give a non-negative result.
5. Reference graph dynamics
The previous section shows how the effect interpretation
(IOstd ,Ref std ) can be used to verify results that rely on local
state abstraction. However, it does not suffice for proving a
set of reference graph properties that have previously been
proposed as characteristic for object-capability languages.
What is lacking is a way to restrict the primitive effects
that an expression is allowed to produce. In this section,
we introduce those properties, and in the next section, we
discuss how they follow from effect parametricity.
The intended properties are standard in the object ca-
pability literature and have previously been formalised and
proposed as a characterisation of capability-safety by Maf-
feis et al. [9]. For a programming language with a certain
type of operational semantics, they characterise capability-
safety through a formalisation of properties about the evo-
lution of the reference graph. Here, we instantiate their
formalism for λJS and explain that their properties are not
sufficient to characterise capability-safety. Sometimes, Maf-
feis et al.’s definitions are more general than our instantiation
of it, but not fundamentally stronger.
5.1. Capability safety as reference graph dynamics
We first introduce some notations used by Maffeis et
al.: e v e′ if e is a syntactic subterm of e′. Sets D def= {r, w}
and A def= Loc × D represent read and write permissions and
actions on references. For example, (l, r) denotes reading
location l. Allocating and initialising a new memory location
is considered a combined reading (r) and writing (w) action.
The can influence-relation on actions (l, d).(l′, d′) holds when
l = l′, d = w and d′ = r. A set of actions A1 can influence
another A2 (A1 .A2) when a1 .a2 for some a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2.
We define a labeled version of λJS ’s impure evaluation
judgement in Figure 7: (σ, e) →A (σ, e) with A ⊆ A. We
further instantiate Maffeis et al.’s framework by defining
tCap(e)
def
= {l | l v e}, i.e. the capabilities of an expression are
the references that it syntactically contains, priv(l) def= {r, w}
(i.e. a primitive reference provides reading and writing
e1 ↪→ e2
(σ,E〈e1〉)→∅ (σ,E〈e2〉)
(E-PURE) l 6∈ dom(σ) A = {(l, r), (l,w)}
(σ,E〈ref v〉)→A (σ[l 7→ v], E〈l〉)
(E-REF)
(σ,E〈deref l〉)→{(l,r)} (σ,E〈σ(l)〉) (E-DEREF)
(σ,E〈l = v〉)→{(l,w)} (σ[l 7→ v], E〈v〉) (E-SETREF)
Figure 7. Action-labeled version →A of the impure λJS evaluation judgement. Multi-step versions →iA and →∗A accumulate labels of substeps.
authority) and cAuth(σ, l) is the least set of actions A such
that {(l, r), (l, w)} ⊆ A and
(
∪(l,r)∈A tCap(σ(l))× D
)
⊆ A. In
other words, a reference l in store σ carries the authority
to read and write values at location l and, recursively, the
authority of those values.
Maffeis et al. characterise capability-safety by the fol-
lowing reference graph dynamics properties. For brevity, we
define nauth(σ′, σ) def= (dom(σ′) \ dom(σ)) × {r, w}. The map
auth(σ, e)
def
=
⋃
c∈tCap(e) cAuth(σ, c) must be a valid author-
ity map for the language. This is by definition true iff
(σ, e)→A (σ′, e′) implies that
• RG-AUTH1: A ⊆ auth(σ, e) ∪ nauth(σ′, σ)
• RG-AUTH2: auth(σ′, e′) ⊆ auth(σ, e) ∪ nauth(σ′, σ)
Additionally, if (σ, e)→∗A (σ′, v) 6→ and v ∈ Val , then for any
location l, we must have:
• RG-CONN: A 6 . cAuth(σ, l) implies that cAuth(σ′, l) =
cAuth(σ, l) ∪ {(l, r), (l, w)}
• RG-NOAMPL: A . cAuth(σ, l) implies that
cAuth(σ′, l) ⊆ cAuth(σ, l)∪{(l, r), (l, w)}∪auth(σ, e)∪nauth(σ′, σ)
Property RG-CONN is known as “Only Connectivity Begets
Connectivity” and RG-NOAMPL as “No Authority Ampli-
fication”.
5.2. Reference graph dynamics are not enough
The above properties are necessary but not sufficient to
characterise object-capability languages. They constitute an
over-approximation of the authority of a term, known as
the topology-only bound on authority. The approximation is
imprecise because it considers indirect references equivalent
to direct references and as such ignores objects’ behaviour.
Consider, for example, the ticket dispenser example from
Section 4.1, where attacker code was given access to a func-
tion dispTkt = func(){let(v = deref o){o := v + 2; v}} but no
direct access to reference o. The topology-only bound does
not distinguish an expression with a reference to dispTkt or
a direct reference to o, so the safety of our ticket dispenser
cannot follow. In fact, none of the results from Section 4 can
be proven using just the topology-only bound on authority.
To be clear, the problem is not just that the soundness
of those examples is hard to prove using the topology-only
bound. Rather, their soundness does not follow because the
bound is not strong enough. One can prove this by con-
structing a language that satisfies the bound but invalidates
the examples, for example by adding a deepInspect primitive
that returns the set of references held by an arbitrary value,
i.e. deepInspect(dispTkt) evaluates to the singleton list [o].
More details about this argument are deferred to the TR.
ι
rgn
j,L
def
= (L,⊆,⊆, Hrgnj )
Ref
rgn
j : W →mon,ne UPred(Loc)
Ref
rgn
j w
def
=
{
(n, l)
∣∣∣ w(j) = (L,⊆,⊆, H), l ∈ L ∧H =n+1 Hrgnj }
IO
rgn
j : (W →mon,ne UPred(Val))→W →ne Pred(Cmd)
IO
rgn
j P w
def
=
(n, cmd)|
(cmd ∈ Val ⇒ (n, cmd) ∈ P w)∧
∀L,H. if w(j) = (L,⊆,⊆, H) ∧H =n+1 Hrgnj then
∀0 < i ≤ n, σr :n w, σf . (σr unionmulti σf , cmd)→iA (σ′, e′)⇒
∃σ′r , w′ wpub w, for L′ = L ∪ (dom(σ′r) \ dom(σr)).
w′(j) = (L′,⊆,⊆, H) ∧ σ′ = σ′r unionmulti σf ∧A ⊆ (L′ × D)∧
(n− i, e′) ∈ E[IOrgnj P ] w′ ∧ σ′r :n−i w′

H
rgn
j : P(Loc)→ Wˆ →mon,ne UPred(Store)
H
rgn
j L w
def
={
(n, σ)
∣∣∣∣∣ dom(σ) = L and for all l ∈ L. n = 0 or(n− 1, σ(l)) ∈ JSValIOrgnj ,Ref rgnj (roll−1 w)
}
Figure 8. Region-based effect interpretation for memory access bounds.
6. Reference Graph Dynamics from Effect
Parametricity
Although the reference graph dynamics properties from
the previous section are not sufficient to reason about ex-
amples like those in Section 4 or to characterise capability
safety, they may still be of interest in some applications.
In this section, we explain how our Fundamental Theorem
implies results that are analogous but a bit more semantic.
First, we need to explain that we cannot derive the
properties themselves because of the more semantic nature
of our logical relations. Consider, for example, an expression
e and a location l that e does not mention (i.e. l 6v e). Now
take x fresh and consider e′ def= let(x = l) e. Syntactically, e′
holds a reference to capability l and Maffeis et al. would
consider it to have greater authority, despite the semantic
fact that e′ never uses l. However, e′ purely evaluates to
e, so they are equivalent for our logical relations and any
results we prove will not distinguish them. Nevertheless, we
can prove properties that are analogous but more semantic.
6.1. An Effect Interpretation for Memory Regions
We start from an effect interpretation that formulates
a region memory discipline, defined in Figure 8. It uses
a special-purpose island ιrgnj,L to define the current set of
addresses in a memory region. This set may grow over
time (as expressed by the island’s transition relation), with
newly allocated references or with existing references whose
ownership is passed to the region. j is the index of the island
in the world. We require that regions are isolated from one
another and the rest of the world, i.e. values stored in region
j must themselves never access memory outside the region.
Formally, the heap invariant Hrgnj enforces this by requiring
that values in the region are accepted by JSValIOrgnj ,Ref
rgn
j
.
We instantiate ρ as Ref rgnj , accepting only region j’s
current addresses, and µ as IOrgnj , which essentially accepts
expressions that only access memory within region j and
otherwise respect the world invariants and authority bounds.
More formally, IOrgnj P w n-accepts expressions e that are
n-accepted by P if they are values and such that executing
them in i steps in a w-acceptable store σr will only access
memory locations inside region j. The resulting expression
must n − i-satisfy E[IOrgnj P ] in a publicly accessible ex-
tension w′ of world w. The resulting world must extend the
region with all freshly allocated references. Additionally, the
store is allowed to contain an additional frame part σf not
governed by w which must be left unmodified.
Contrary to IOstd , the definition of IOrgnj does not
assume that the evaluation (σr unionmulti σf , cmd) →iA (σ′, e′) pro-
duces an e′ that is a value. This means that IOrgnj provides
guarantees about arbitrary computations, not just those that
terminate successfully. Such definitions are typically only
found in logical relations for concurrent programming lan-
guages, but in our case we want memory access bounds even
for evaluations that do not terminate or end up in a stuck
state. Formally, it does complicate the definition of IOrgn
because if e′ is potentially not a value, it makes no sense to
require that it is accepted by P w′. The solution is to require
recursively that it is accepted by E[IOrgnj P ].
6.2. Memory access bounds
With this effect interpretation, our Fundamental Theo-
rem implies memory access bounds similar to the reference
graph dynamics properties. To emphasise the correspon-
dence, we define memBound(σ, e, L) as a judgement analogous
to (but more semantic than) the statement auth(σ, e) = L×D.
Definition 1. We define memBound(σ, e, L) for a store σ and
L ⊆ dom(σ) iff for j = 1, w = [j 7→ ιrgnj,L ] and any n, we have:
• (n, e) ∈ E[IOrgnj JSValIOrgnj ,Ref rgnj ] w
• ∃σf , σr .σ = σr unionmulti σf and σr :n w
The Fundamental Theorem implies that memBound(σ, e, L)
holds whenever auth(σ, e) = L× D (proof in TR):
Lemma 4. If auth(σ, e) = L× D, then memBound(σ, e, L).
Furthermore, the memBound judgement satisfies properties
akin to the reference graph dynamics properties. The fol-
lowing property corresponds to properties RG-AUTH1 and
RG-AUTH2 in the previous section. It specifies that memBound
bounds an expression’s memory access and that the property
is preserved by evaluation.
Lemma 5. If memBound(σ1, e1, L) and (σ1, e1) →iA (σ2, e2),
then for L′ = L ∪ (dom(σ2) \ dom(σ1))
• A ⊆ L′ × D and σ2|dom(σ1)\L = σ1|dom(σ1)\L.
• memBound(σ2, e2, L′).
The next two properties correspond to RG-CONN
and RG-NOAMPL. The first states that evaluating an expres-
sion whose authority cannot influence another expression’s,
leaves that other expression’s memBound unaffected. The lat-
ter specifies that evaluating an expression whose authority
can influence another expression’s, may increase that other
expression’s memBound, but not beyond the union of the two
expressions’ original bounds and newly allocated locations.
Lemma 6. If (σ, e) →∗A (σ′, v), A 6 . L × D and
memBound(σ, e′, L), then still memBound(σ′, e′, L).
Lemma 7. If memBound(σ, e1, L1), memBound(σ, e2, L2),
(σ, e1) →∗A (σ′, v) and A . L2 × D, then we have
memBound(σ′, e2, L′) for L′ = L1 ∪ L2 ∪ (dom(σ′) \ dom(σ)).
7. Related Work
Object capability research has a long history, possibly
starting with Dennis and Van Horn’s proposed hardware
protection primitives [1]. Later work on operating systems
and processor hardware with capability security primitives
is surveyed by Levy [21]. More recent work includes Cap-
sicum (primitive capabilities offered by FreeBSD kernel
primitives) [3] and CHERI (processor-level object capa-
bilities combined with virtual memory) [4]. A thorough
overview of the object capability model and the capability-
safe programming language E is in Miller’s PhD thesis [2].
Other capability-safe languages include Joe-E [5], Emily [7],
W7 [22], Newspeak [8] and Google Caja [6].
Two papers formalise reference graph properties for
capability systems using an operational semantics. The first
is Maffeis et al.’s paper, presented in Section 5. The sec-
ond is Shapiro and Weber’s verification of the confinement
properties of EROS [23]. They prove a property related to
one of the properties in Section 5, which also ignores the
behaviour of processes/objects.
Dimoulas et al. formalise capability safety in terms of a
notion of component boundaries and the ownership of code
by security principals [24], in a simple language without
mutable state. The formalisation of capability-safety does
not seem intended for reasoning about code. Instead, they
propose to extend the object capability language with alter-
native security mechanisms, that enable specific types of rea-
soning: built-in dynamic access control and an information
flow type system. Similarly, Drossopoulou and Noble argue
to extend object capability languages with a kind of declar-
ative policies [25]. Generally, we are not convinced that
modular enforcement of typical policies requires additional
security mechanisms in the language. Rather, they can be
implemented cleanly and modularly using standard patterns.
Proving that such implementations enforce a declarative
policy can be done using techniques as developed here.
Spiessens studied the safety of capability patterns us-
ing Knowledge Behaviour Models and a logic called
SCOLL [10], [11]. His goal of validating the safety of
capability patterns is the same as ours, but he reasons at
a higher level of abstraction, viewing executable code as
interacting abstract entities with a behaviour specification.
As a result, his results do not directly apply to concrete
code in a concrete language, but both the implementations
and the language must be separately verified to satisfy their
specification. Spiessens’ automatic approximation of future
behaviour imposes some restrictions in the logic, like the
absence of non-monotonic authority changes.
Taly et al. automatically analyse security-critical APIs
in a secure subset of JavaScript to guarantee that API
implementations do not leak references to objects marked
as internal [26]. A limitation is that they only deal with
leaking of direct references. Establishing security requires
separate verification of objects not marked as internal.
Garg et al. [27] and Jia et al. [28] have proposed and
studied powerful program logics for interface-confined code
in, respectively, a first-order and higher-order setting. Like
us, they prove properties of arbitrary, untyped attacker code
and can reason about memory as well as other effects. They
do this for interface-confined code, a syntactic requirement
that appears similar to the restrictions in an object-capability
language. However, the work does not intend to cover
object-capability languages, does not look into previous
notions of capability-safety (see Section 5), and the authors
state that they cannot model object-capability languages in
general. Specifically, there is no direct way to reason about
untrusted code that gets access to some primitive pointers,
but not all, although this can be modeled using additional
indirection. It is not clear to what extent the work supports
patterns with separate authority over shared data structures
as discussed in Section 4.
A second category of related work is on logical rela-
tions for proving encapsulation properties in higher-order
languages. The logical relations we use are (unary) step-
indexed Kripke logical relations [12], [29]. We have gen-
erally followed the notations used by Birkedal et al. [15]
and we used their recipe for defining recursive worlds using
ultrametric space theory. Our worlds are inspired by Dreyer
et al.’s [16]. The region-based effect interpretation used in
Section 6 produces a logical relation related to one used
by Thamsborg et al. for proving relational results about a
region-based type-and-effect system [17].
There is a long line of work on using logical relations
for proving local state abstraction results [16], [30]–[35].
The work covers increasingly complex languages (e.g. stack
variables vs. first-order heap vs. higher-order heap) and uses
increasingly complex Kripke worlds for specifying invari-
ants and protocols on the evolution of acceptable/related
stores. Recursive types and higher-order heaps are dealt with
using either step-indexing like us or more complex (but
perhaps more elegant) solutions based on domain theory.
Our work is closely related to this line of work, but
there are some differentiating aspects. First, we work for an
untyped language. Although it is known that step-indexing
enables logical relations for untyped languages [36], we
are (to our knowledge) the first to demonstrate this for
a language with a mutable store. Our Kripke worlds are
based on and similar to those of Dreyer et al. [16], but
some points are novel. Our use of public/private transitions
to model restricted authority over a shared resource, and
the fact that the public transition relation in our islands can
grow are both (to the best of our knowledge) novel. The idea
enables a kind of rely-guarantee reasoning, as demonstrated
in Section 4.3 and the approach bears a resemblance to
permission assertions on a shared region, as in, for example,
Dinsdale-Young et al.’s Concurrent Abstract Predicates [37].
Also novel is our notion of effect interpretations as a way
to define custom world-indexed restrictions on primitive
effects, as well as the axioms prescribing compatibility of
the effect interpretation to the publicly accessible effects
of the language. Finally, perhaps most importantly, the link
to object capabilities and our characterisation of capability-
safety are novel.
8. Conclusion
In summary, this paper presents a novel approach for
formal reasoning about a capability-safe programming lan-
guage. We use state-of-the-art techniques from program-
ming language research for capturing the encapsulation of
the language, supplemented with some additional ideas for
capturing specificities of the model. Our demonstration of
three typical but non-trivial patterns in Section 4 and our
derivation of reference graph dynamics results in Section 6
shows that our approach is significantly more powerful than
previous approaches and sufficiently powerful for realistic
examples. We have presented our technique for a subset of
λJS , a relatively simple core calculus for JavaScript, but
we expect that it generalises to other settings including
assembly languages with primitive capabilities [4], [38],
capability-safe subsets of JavaScript and typed capability-
safe languages [5], [7], [8]. In the TR, we discuss how
our techniques generalise to relational rather than unary
properties.
Our work also offers new insight into the nature
of capability-safe programming languages. Summarily, the
property groups three characteristics, all captured by our
model: (a) encapsulation of local state: a quite common
feature in programming languages like Java, ML, JavaScript
etc. (b) absence of global mutable state: a less common
feature which is nevertheless crucial for isolating compo-
nents from each other (like the example in Section 4.3) and,
finally, (c) primitive effects only available through primitive
capabilities, so authority to produce primitive effects can be
controlled by giving components access to the capability or
not.
With the better understanding of capability-safety, this
work creates the potential for a program logic (perhaps with
automated tool support) that can be used to conveniently
reason about code in a capability-safe language. Specif-
ically, our Fundamental Theorem tells us what semantic
properties such a logic or tool can soundly offer as axioms
over untrusted code. As such, this paper contributes a key
semantic understanding, but the design of a program logic
or automated tool remains future work.
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